Western New England Law Review
Volume 1 1 (1978-1979)
Issue 4

Article 8

1-1-1979

INSURANCE—THE STANDARD OF
INTENT IN INSURANCE CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION—Ambassador Insurance
Company v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603
(1978)
R. Stephen Lee

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
R. Stephen Lee, INSURANCE—THE STANDARD OF INTENT IN INSURANCE CONTRACT INTERPRETATION—Ambassador
Insurance Company v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978), 1 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 813 (1979),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol1/iss4/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

INSURANCE-THE STANDARD OF INTENT IN INSURANCE CON

INTERPRETATION-Ambassador Insurance
Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978).
TRACT

Company

v.

The exclusion of intentional injury from [insurance] coverage
stems from a fear that an individual might be encouraged to in
flict injury intentionally if he was assured against the dollar con
sequences . . . . Pulling the other way is the public interest that
the victim be compensated, and . . . the victim is aided by the
narrowest view of the policy exclusion consistent with the pur
pose of not encouraging an intentional attack. And the insured,
in his own right, is also entitled to the maximum protection con
sistent with the public purpose the exclusion is intended to
serve. l

In the early morning hours of May 11, 1973, a fire broke out
in the staiIwell of a two-and-a-half story, four-family house in
Passaic, New Jersey. The blaze spread rapidly,.through the old
wooden tenement building and killed four persons. Joseph Satkin,
a real estate agent and landlord of the building, had procured
Dennis Priest 2 to set the fire. Satkin hoped to collect the proceeds
of a fire insurance policy covering the building. 3 Instead, he was
tried and convicted of arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and fel
ony murder for having intentionally caused the fire. 4 'Rafael Mon
tes, as administrator ad prosequendam and as general administra
tor, brought a civil action against Satkin for the death of Marilyn
Ortega Perez, an infant who perished in the blaze. 5
The Ambassador Insurance Co., which had issued a compre
hensive general liability policy to Satkin, instituted a declaratory
judgment proceeding. The insurance company contended that
1. Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7, 15 (1970) (citations
omitted).
2. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 147 N.J. Super. 286, 290, 371 A.2d 292, 294
(App. Div. 1977), affd, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978). The policy was issued to
Satkin on or about April 18, 1973, approximately one month before the fire. Brief for
Defendants-Appellants at 3.
3. It should be noted that "[olne who commits arson may be found guilty of the
murder of an inhabitant of the dwelling who lost his life in the fire although per
sonal injury was neither intended nor expected." R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL
LAW 38 (2d ed. 1969).
4. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978).
5. Id. The wrongful death action was placed on the inactive trial calendar
pending final disposition of the insurer's declaratory judgment proceeding.
813
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Satkin was not entitled to coverage under the policy because he
deliberately started the fire. Since insurance coverage is generally
denied for injuries caused by intentional acts, 6 the trial court exam
ined Satkin's intent. It concluded that the deaths and injuries were
the intended results of a deliberate act. Consequently, the court
denied coverage under the policy. The New Jersey Superior Court
reversed, reasoning that although Satkin's act was in wanton and
reckless disregard for the safety of those living in the building, he
did not specifically intend to injure or kill anyone. The deaths and
injuries were, according to the court, the unintended consequences
of a wilful act. Since there was no intent to injure, coverage under
the policy was allowed. In Ambassador Insurance Company v.
Montes,7 the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court's decision but omitted any discussion of the issue of intent.
The court determined that the insurance policy clearly obligated
Ambassador to pay, on Satkin's behalf, the damages for the Perez
child's death. 8 The court reached this decision by ignoring the lan
guage in Satkin's insurance policy which was designed to exclude
coverage for injuries caused by intentional acts. Had the court
given effect to this exclusionary language, it could then have re
solved the question of what level of intent should be necessary to
provide insurance coverage under a liability policy.
The Ambassador decision can best be understood by viewing
it in the context of the gradual developments in insurance law.
Throughout its history, insurance has been alternately hailed as a
promoter of commercial welfare and damned as a generator of
evil. 9 Fire insurance was once regarded with suspicion as a tempta
tion to commit arson. 10 Liability insurance was considered illegal
because it encouraged the insured to disregard the safety of oth
ers.ll Opponents of insurance argued that the protection afforded
the insured by the liability policy removed the financial deterrent
against negligent and criminal acts,12 Under the modern view,
however, insurance is an accepted arrangement for transferring and
distributing risk. 13
6. See notes 72-95 infra and accompanying text.
7. 76 N.J. 477,388 A.2d 603 (1978).
8. Id.
9. McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUM. L.
26 (1941).
10. Simon, Insurance Coverage for Illegal Acts, 8 AM. Bus. L.J. 37 (1970).
11. ld.
12. McNeely, supra note 9 at 26.
13. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw § 1.2(a), at 2 (1971).

REV.
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True liability insurance apparently started with employers' lia
bility insurance. 14 It was initiated, not to provide compensation for
injured employees, but to protect the employer against litigation
growing out of employers' liability acts.15 Liability insurance began
as a measure of individual protection rather than as a scheme for
social betterment. Since then, however, there has been a substan
tial reversal in popular thinking, in the approach of courts today
and in legislative trends towards the socialization of risk through
insurance. 16
The legality of liability insurance was accepted by courts partly
due to the fairness of insurers in settling early claims. 17 As insur
ance satisfied these claims, new demands were made for protection
against new risks. IS Liability insurance expanded "like a New
England farmhouse, with unplanned additions stuck on as occasion
demanded. "19
The scope of insurance has reflected these changes in public
policy. Courts first accepted the right to insurance protection for a
wrongdoer's acts in cases involving an insured's own negligence. 20
Other decisions concerning wanton and reckless conduct permitted
recovery where the insured's act was unintentional. 21 Current atti
tudes toward the scope of insurance coverage are exemplified by
the New Jersey Superior Court's decision of Rotwein v. General
Accident Group. 22 The court held that for an insurance contract to
14. McNeely, supra note 9 at 28.
The idea of indemnity against the legal liability of one person for injuries he
has caused to a person or the property of a third person is not a recent in
vention. An interesting analogy can be drawn between the modem institu
tion of liability insurance and the wergeld of the Anglo-Saxons in which. a
group stood mutually liable for the criminal acts of its members. A less su
ru:::.rAroi!ll
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whereby an insurer undertook the risk of liability of the insured for damage
inflicted on other ships through collision.
ld. at 27.
15. ld. at 28.
16. ld.
17. ld.
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18. ld.
19. ld.
20. Waters v. Merchants Ins. Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 213 (1837). The steamboat
Lioness was lost by an explosion of gun powder cargo due to an employee's negli
gence. The Court held, "There is nothing unreasonable, unjust, or inconsistent with
public policy, in allowing the insured to insure himself against all losses from any
perils not occasioned by his own personal fraud." ld. at 221.
21. Simon, supra note 10 at 40.
22. 103 N.J. Super. 406, 247 A.2d 370 (1968). "It must be emphasized that pub
lic policy will usually not be applied to invalidate a contract unless there is some de
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be unenforceable, it must be patently offensive or inimical to the
public welfare and have a clear capacity to support or encourage
conduct which is deleterious, antisocial or unlawful.
Although courts recognize that a wrongdoer has a right to cov
erage, they have only reluctantly extended that coverage to indi
viduals who intentionally cause injury.23 They have held that pub
lic policy prohibits an insurer 'from agreeing to indemnify an
insured against the civil consequences of his own wilful acts. 24
Most courts assume that antisocial conduct would be encouraged if
insurance were available to shift the financial cost of the loss from
the wrongdoer to his insurer.25 This public policy is further ratio
nalized as a matter of moral principle, since a wrongdoer should
not be permitted to receive insurance proceeds for an intentionally
inflicted injury.26 If insurance coverage is allowed when the in
sured intentionally injures a third party, the wrongdoer is spared
the financial cost of his own wrong. Denying the wrongdoer the
right to shift the financial responsibility to his insurer is a means of
punishing the wrongdoer for his wilful act. 27
With this background, the New Jersey Supreme Court ana
lyzed the comprehensive general liability policy issued to Joseph
Satkin. The policy provided:
The company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which
the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages be
cause of. . . bodily injury or . . . property damage to which this
finite basis therefor in law, legal precedent or recognized governmental policy affect
ing the general welfare." Id. at 416-17,247 A.2d at 376 (citation omitted).
23. "If the single insured is allowed through intentional or reckless acts to con
sciously control risks covered by the policy, a central concept of insurance is vio
lated." Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Bartlett, 240 N.W. 2d 310, 313 (Minn. 1976).
24. See Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Ill. 2d 227, 142 N.E.2d 5
(1957); Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 189 A.2d 204 (1963); Malanga v.
Manufacturers Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958); Lyons v. 'Hartford Ins.
Group, 125 N,J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (App. Div. 1973), cert. denied, 64 N.J. 332,
315 A.2d 411 (1974).
25. Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional Torts,
20 HASTINGS L.J. 1219, 1245-46 (1969). One judge cited testimony in a case stating
that as the plaintiff and defendant were riding in the latter's car, the plaintiff pro
tested against the defendant's reckless driving. " 'Don't worry,' the defendant said, 'I
carry insurance.' A moment later came the crash." McNeely, supra note 9, at 33. The
case was Herschensohn v. Weisman, 80 N.H. 557, 119 A. 705 (1923).
26. Farbstein & Stillman, Sf"':m note 25; Ruvolo v. American 490, 189 A.2d 204
(1963). In this declaratory judgment action brought by the Ambassador Insurance
Co., however, it is not the insured who would be benefited by receiving the insur
ance proceeds, but the Perez family.
27. See note 26 supra.
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Insurance applies, caused by an occurrence and the company
shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the In
sured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or prop
erty damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are
groundless, false or fraudulent.... 28

Both parties agreed that the record. was limited to the policy in ev
idence which contained neither a definition of "occurrence" nor a
provision which excluded coverage for intentional acts. 29 With the
record so limited, the court found that, on its face, the insurance
policy obligated Ambassador to defend this action. The court held
that the policy ostensibly obligated Ambassador to pay on Satkin's
behalf any amount, up to the policy's stated limits, for the injuries
suffered and for the death of Marilyn Ortega Perez. 30
Once the court clarified Ambassador's obligation under the in
surance contract, it then examined the policy considerations in
volved in allowing insurance coverage. Ambassador had contended
that public policy prohibits an insurer from agreeing to indemnify
an insured against the civil consequences of his own wilful acts.31
The court rationalized, however, that when an innocent third per
son receives the protection afforded by the wrongdoer's insurance,
this policy should not prevail. 32 The court employed the equitable
remedy of subrogation to provide the Perez family the protection
afforded by Satkin's insurance. 33 The court held that this' remedy
would give Ambassador a cause of action against Satkin for its pay
ment of his debt to the Perez family while also effectuating the

28. 76 N.J. at 481,388 A.2d at 605.
29. Id. at n.l, 388 A.2d at 605 n.1. The court, contending it was bound by stipu
lations of fact, did not discuss t..he meaning of "occurrence" or the exclusionary pro
visions for injuries resulting from intentional acts.
30. Id. at 481-82,388 A.2d at 605-06.
31. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
32. 76 N.J. at 482,388 A.2d at 606.
33. Subrogation is an ancient equitable device to compel the iiltimate dis
charge of an obligation by one who in good conscience ought to pay it. In a
comprehensive review of the nature of the doctrine and its relation to in
demnity, Mr. Chief Justice Vanderbilt pointed out that the right 'does not
arise out of contract but rather exists without the consent of the insured, al
though of course the parties may by agreement waive or limit the right'; the
subrogee 'in effect steps into the shoes of the insured and can recover only
if the insured likewise could have recovered'; and it is now the settled rule
that generally an action in subrogation 'on the contractual obligation of the
defendant to an insured exists in favor of the insurer.'
George M. Brewster & Son v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17 N.J. 20,28-29, 109 A.2d 805,
809 (1954) (citations omitted).
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public policy of forcing the wrongdoer to accept the financial re
SpOI sibility arising from his intentional act. 34
The Ambassador court recognized the importance of com
pensating individuals who have been injured by some criminal
act. 35 Never questioning whether Satkin intended the death of
Marilyn Ortega Perez, it sought some means to provide compensa
tion to the Perez family. The court determined· that Ambassador
had contracted to pay an innocent person for the damages caused
by its insured. It held such payments should be made, even
though ascribable to a criminal event, so long as the benefit of the
payment would not inure to Satkin. 36 The court stated that it was
equitable and just for Ambassador to pay Satkin's d~bt and subse
quently be indemnified by Satkin for its payment to the Perez fam
ily.37
The New Jersey Court's use of subrogation comports with the
idea that it is used "to compel the ultimate discharge of an obliga
tion by one who in good conscience ought to pay it. "38 The basic
premise of subrogation is that one person, having paid the obliga
tion of another, is substituted as the owner of a lawful claim or

34. 76 N.J. 477,388 A.2d 603 (1978).
35. This public policy has been codified in the New Jersey Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act of 1971. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-1O (West Supp. 1978).
§ 52:4B-IO. Persons entitled to compensation; order
In any case in which a person is injured or killed by any act or omission
of any other person which is within the description of the offenses listed in
section 11 of this act, the board may ... order the payment of compensation
in accordance with the provisions of this act:
a. to or on behalf of the victim,
c. in the case of the death of the.victim, to or for the benefit of the de
pendents of the deceased victim, or anyone or more of such dependents.
In determining whether to make an order under this section, the
board may consider any circumstances it determines to be relevant,
including provocation, consent or the behavior of the victim which di
rectly or indirectly contributed to his injury or death, the prior case his
tory, if any, of the victim and any other relevant matters.
An order may be made under this section whether or not any person
is prosecuted or convicted of any offense arising out of such act or omis
sion....
Some of the offenses to which the statute applies are as follows: assault constituting
a high misdemeanor; mayhem; threats to do bodily harm; lewd, indecent, or obscene
acts; murder; manslaughter and rape. N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:4B-11 (1971).
36. 76 N.J. at 483,388 A.2d at 606.
37. Id. at 486,388 A.2d at 608.
38. George M. Brewster v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17 N.J. 20, 28, 109 A.2d 805,
809 (1954).
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right. 39 The substitute succeeds to the other in relation to the debt
or claim and its rights, remedies or securities. 4o In the absence of
subrogation, either the insured would collect twice and be unjustly
enriched,41 or, if the insured were not entitled to double recovery,
the third party wrongdoer would avoid the financial obligation
arising from his tortious, act. 42
The New Jersey Supreme Court also realized that subrogation
does not depend on contract language. 43 An insurer is generally
entitled to subrogation, either by contract or in equity for the
amount of the indemnity paid. 44 "The right of subrogation, or more
properly indemnification where sought from its own insured, is en
forced where denying such a remedy would be inequitable. "45 It
will be applied according to the dictates of equity, good conscience
and considerations of public policy.46 This doctrine is founded
.39. Meyers, Subrogation Rights and Recoveries Arising out of First Party Con
tracts, 9 FORUM 83 (1973).
40. Id.
41. "The general rule is that the assured should make no profit from his insur
ance, the insurance being an indemnity and nothing more." Hodgin, Subrogation in
Insurance Law, 1975 J. Bus. L. 114, 116. In this declaratory judgment action brought
by Ambassador, however, it is not the insured who is seeking the benefit of the in
surer's payment, but an innocent third Qarty.
42. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d 288 (1954).
"Manifestly it would be unjust to compel the insurer to suffer the consequences of
the wrongful act of another." Auto Owner's Protective Exch. v. Edwards, 82 Ind.
App. 558, 563, 136 N.E. 577, 579 (1922). In this declaratory judgment action brought
by Ambassador, however, it is not a third party wrongdoer who would avoid financial
responsibility by the insurer's payment, but Satkin, the named insured.
43. 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978). See generally 6A J. ApPLEMAN, INSUR
ANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4054, at 142-46 (1962).
44. Id.
45. 8 J. APPLEMAN, iNSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4935, at 461 (1973). The
distinction between indemnification and subrogation should be noted. The term "in
demnification" refers to those situations in which an individual is compensated for a
loss already incurred. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 148 Md. 289,
129 A. 660, 664 (1925). The term "subrogation," however, is used to describe the sit
uation in which an individual who has paid the debt of another is substituted to all
rights and remedies of the other. The debt is treated in equity as still existing for the
benefit of the person who actually paid the debt. Callan Court Co. v. Citizens & S.
Nat'l Bank, 184 Ga. 87, 133, 134, 190 S.E. 831, 856 (1937). In the typical subrogation
situation, the insurance company indemnifies the insured for its loss and is then sub
rogated to any rights that the insured may have against a third party who caused the
loss. George M. Brewster & Son v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17 N ..b 20, 109 A.2d 805
(1954). In this declaratory judgment action, however, it is a third party who has sus
tained a loss and is seeking the benefit of the insured's comprehensive general lia
bility policy. The proper term for describing the payment Satkin must make to Am
bassador is "indemnification."
46. 6A J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE, § 4054, at 142-46 (1962).
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upon equitable principles and upon the relationship of the par
ties. 47 "Subrogation rests on the maxim that no one should be
enriched by another's loss. "48 Consequently, courts usually invoke
subrogation unless its application would be inimical to public pol
icy. 49
The court further supported its decision by referring to cases
in which individuals have been allowed to recover losses occa
sioned by an insured's intentional act. 50 In re Estate of Gardi
nier,51 suggests that when an accident happens, an injured party
acquires an interest in the insurance policy which cannot be fore
closed by litigation or agreement between the insurer and the in
sured alone. 52 Thus, the Perez family obtained benefiCiary status in
the liability policy.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 143.
49. Burford v. Glasgow Water Co., 223 Ky. 54, 2 S.W.2d 1027 (1928).
50. 76 N.J. at 483-84, 388 A.2d at 606. See Malanga v. Manufacturers' Cas. Ins.
Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958). An insurance policy issued to a partnership
was held to provide insurance coverage to partners not involved in an assault and
battery committed by one partner. The issue ofthat partner's "liability to the defend
ant insurer under its right of subrogation" was in no way affected. 28 N.J. at 230, 146
A.2d at 1l0. Morgan v. Greater N.Y. Tax Payers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 305 N.Y. 243, 112
N.E.2d 273 (1953). The New York Court of Appeals held that a public liability policy
extended coverage to the individual insured for liability for assault and battery
committed by him or at his direction, even though committed by his partner. The
policy was issued to the members of the copartnership as individuals and insured
against liability for assault and battery unless committed by or at the direction of the
insured. "To indemnify him does not save him from the consequences of his crimi
nal act for he committed none." 305 N.Y. at 248, 112 N.E.2d at 275. Fidelity-Phenix
Fire Ins. Co. v. Queen City Bus & Transfer Co., 3 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1925). A fire in
surance company was compelled to pay the proceeds of a fire insurance policy to the
corporation to be used for creditors and stockholders other than the wrongdoing
president who had intentionally set fire to a bus owned by the corporation and on
which he held a mortgage. The dissenting opinion distinguished the cases relied
upon by the majority by pointing out that in each case the "party recovering from the
insurance carrier was an express beneficiary. . . ." 76 N.J. at 497, 388 A.2d at 613
(Clifford, J" dissenting).
51. 40 N.J. 261,191 A.2d 294 (1963).
52. Id. Liability insurance has come to be used openly and extensively as a de
vice for securing compensation to victims. Liability policies usually provide that,
"No action shall lie against the company ... until the amount of the insured's obliga
tion shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after
actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company."
Consequently, the insured may proceed against an insurer under the payment provi
sions when a victim obtains a tort judgment. "[A]t that time, the victim may proceed
against the insurer by garnishment or otherwise, even without the insured's
cooperation.... in this limited sense, the victim may be referred to as a third party
beneficiary of the liability insurance contract." R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 4.8(b),
at 233-34 (1971).
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As beneficiaries under this theory of recovery, the Perez fami
ly's interest in the policy could not 'be denied because of Satkin's
arson. This theory was discussed in Howell v. Ohio Casualty Co. 53
In Howell, an innocent spouse received the proceeds from a fire
insurance policy after her husband intentionally set fire to the
property they owned as tenants by the entirety. The court declined
to impute the husband's fraud to the wife. 54 It stressed that one
party having rights under the policy is not penalized for the wrong
ful acts of another. Applying this principle to the Perez family's
right to recovery, Satkin's criminal act would not preclude the fam
ily's right to insurance coverage.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion is sound. If a lia
bility policy ostensibly provides coverage for an insured intentional
wrongdoer, an injured third party should be afforded insurance
coverage. The insurer can subsequently be indemnified by the in
sured. 55 In the instant case, however, this approach is flawed be
cause of twoc erroneous assumptions. The first is that Satkin in
tended to cause Marilyn Ortega Perez' death. The second is that
the policy contained no provision which would exclude insurance
coverage for injuries caused intentionally. The latter assumption
completely overlooks the major purpose of insurance, the socializa
tion of risk from accidental rather than intentional losses. 56
Satkin's policy explicitly limited insurance coverage to dam
ages "caused by an occurrence."57 "Occurrence" was defined as "an
accident . . . which results in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the in
sured. "58 If Satkin meant to cause .the Perez child's death, then
53. 130 N.J. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (App. DivA974).
54. ld. at 354.
55. See notes 31-49 supra and accompanying text.
56. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § l.2(a), at 2 (1971).
57. In 1966, insurance companies began using the term "occurrence" in their
liability insurance forms, hoping that the use of this term would eliminate the need
for an exclusion of intentionally caused injury. It had once been common for all lia
bility policies to express coverage intent by way of the word "accident" but, because
of the many legal problems which arose from its use in that context, it was aban
doned. Other reasons for using "occurrence" were to eliminate the necessity of prov
ing the exact moment at which damage was sustained (Le., to clarify whether an acci
dent must happen "suddenly" or whether it may result from a gradual process) and
to guarantee that the incident happened within the policy period. The definition fur
ther specifies that the loss must be "neither expected not intended from the stand
point of the insured" thus solving the problem of whether the accident should be
viewed from the position of the insured or injured party. [Cas. and Sur. Section].
FIRE CAS. & SUR. BULLETINS (Nat'l Underwriters Co.) Occ-l (1978).
58. 76 N.J. at 493, 388 A.2d at 611-12 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (quoting from
Satkin's policy).
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the insurance company would have no obligation to pay the Perez
family.
The majority of the court justifies disregarding the definition
of "occurrence" because the parties to the suit agreed that the fac
tual record was limited to the policy in evidence. 59 The policy in
evidence did not contain a definition of "occurrence" because Am
bassador's counsel failed to include the page containing defini
tions. 60 Holding that it was bound by stipulations of fact,61 the
court made its decision without referring to Ambassador's defini
tion of the term. It thereby avoided any analysis of the provision
which was intended by Ambassador to exclude coverage for in
tended injuries. 62
The majority's reasoning was justifiably attacked by both the
concurring and dissenting opinions. 63 Even without Ambassador's
definition of "occurrence,"64 the court should have examined the
meaning and the reasons for the term's use. New Jersey's Rules of
Evidence allow judicial notice to be taken of such terms 65 so long
59.

Id. at 481, 388 A.2d at 605.
Id. at 493-94 n.l, 388 A.2d at 612 n.l.
61. Id. Stipulations are agreements between attorneys regulating matters inci
dental to the proceedings or trial. See Lewis v. The Orpheus, 15 F. Cas. 492 (D.
Mass. 1858) (No. 8,330), afI'd, 30 F. Cas. 859 (C.C.D. Mass. 1861) (No. 18,l69);
Southern Colonization Co. v. Howard Cole & Co., 185 Wis. 469, 201 N.W. 817
(1925). They are not binding unless assented to by the parties or their representa
tives and are usually required to be in writing. Holland Banking Co. v. Continental
Nat. Bank, 9 F. Supp. 988 (W.O. Mo. 1934). It is generally held that a stipulation
may be repudiated if it was inadvertently or mistakenly made, provided the motion
is made in sufficient time to prevent prejudice to the opposite party. See, e.g., Miller
v. Schafer, 102 Ariz. 457, 432 P.2d 585 (1967). Consequently, Ambassador's attorney
could have moved that such stipulation be withdrawn.
62. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
63. The concurring opinion "is based on uneasiness over whether the majority
opinion demonstrates coverage under the policy, given the definition of 'occur
renee:" 76 N.J. at 487, 388 A.2d at 608 (Pashman, J., concurring). The dissent ob
serves that "[clonspicuously absent from the majority's analysis ... is any discussion
of the definition of 'oecurrence,' which the policy defines as 'an accident ... which
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured: " 76 N.J. at 493, 388 A.2d at 611 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Accompanying this statement the dissent notes:
I do not understand how we can properiY-<Jr-intelligently decide this
case without application of the policy's definition of 'occurrence: I would
accept as part of the record so much of the insuring agreement filed with us
as contains the definitions of terms used elsewhere in the policy, see R.
2:5-4(a), or at the very least give the attorneys the opportunity to present any
argument relating to the definition of occurrence as they might wish to
make.
Id. at 481-82 n.l, 388 A.2d at 612 n.l (Clifford, J., dissenting).
64. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West 1976). Rule 9 Facts and law which must or
60.
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as "sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy"66 are consulted.
As an alternative to Ambassador's definition, the court could
have construed the term as a layman would understand it. 67 In
Wilkinson & Son, Inc. v. Providence Washington Insurance Co. ,68
the New Jersey Superior Court held that in the absence of a defini
tion in a policy, "the term must be given its plain, ordinary, and
popular meaning and must be interpreted as understood by the av
erage insured when purchasing the policy. "69 Thus, a layman
might find "occurrence" defined as "[a] coming or happening; any
incident or event, especially one that happens without being de
signed or expected. "70 This definition provides the exclusionary lan
guage that the New Jersey Supreme Court said did not exist.
By failing to discuss the insurer's definition of "occurrence,"
the court missed the opportunity to clarify the standard of intent to
be used in interpreting insurance policies. Because the insurer's
definition of "occurrence" excluded intended injuries,71 the court,
by giving effect to this language, could have squarely faced the is-

may be judicially noticed.
(1) Judicial notice shall be taken ... of such specific facts and propositions
of generalized knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot rea
sonably be the subject of dispute.
(2) Judicial notice may be taken, without request by a party, of ... (d) such
facts as are so generally known or of such common notoriety within the area
pertinent to the event that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute;
and (e) specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are
capable of immediate determim•.tion by resort to sources of reasonably indis
putable accuracy.
N.J. STAT. ANN. ~ 2A:84A (West 1976). Rule 12 Judicial notice in proceedings subse
quent to trial.
(1) The failure or refusal of the judge to take judicial notice of a matter or to
instruct the trier of fact with respect to it shall not preclude the judge from
taking judicial notice of the matter in subsequent proceedings in the action.
(2) The reviewing court in its discretion may take judicial notice of any mat
ter specified in Rule 9, whether or not judicially noticed by the judge.
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. ~ 2A:84A (West 1976). Rule 9. See note 65 supra. In his
dissent, Judge Clifford turned to Webster's Third New International and Black's Law
Dictionaries to help construe the term. 76 N.J. at 495, 388 A.2d at 612. (Clifford, J.,
dissenting).
67. See generally Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provi
sions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970).
68. 124 N.J. Super. 466, 307 A.2d 639 (1973). The Supreme Court construes
"occurrence" to mean an event or incident. 76 N.J. at 482 n.2, 388 A.2d at 606 n.2.
This definition, however, ignores the fundamental principle of insurance that loss
must be fortuitous.
69. 124 N.J. Super. at 469,307 A.2d at 641.
70. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Arrington, 98 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1936) (emphasis added).
71. 76 N.J. at 493,388 A.2d at 611-12.
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sue whether Joseph Satkin intended his tenants to suffer injuries or
death. Had it done so, the court would have found that it could
provide insurance coverage to the Perez family despite this exclu
sionary provision.
American courts have used three distinct approaches in at
tempting to define intent when construing insurance policies. 72
Some courts have held that "intentional" refers to the volitional act
which produces an injury.73 If the insured acted deliberately, the
resulting injury is intentional and not accidental for purposes of the
insurance policy. Other courts have held that intentional refers to
the result achieved. Only where the insured meant to inflict the
precise injury or degree of injury which in fact resulted should the
injury be considered as not accidental. 74 Other courts have used an
intermediate standard. These courts have held that "intentional"
refers to the volitional performance of an act with a desire to cause
some injury, although it need not necessarily be the precise injury
or severity of damage that actually results. 75
72.

Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). Com

pare Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967) with Smith v. Moran, 61

Ill. App. 2d 157,209 N.E.2d 18 (1965); Putman v. Zeluff, 372 Mich. 553, 127 NW.2d
374 (1964); and Baldinger v. Conso!. Mut. Ins. Co. 15 App. Div.2d 526, 222 N.Y.S.2d
736 (1961), afI'd, 11 N.Y.2d 1026, 183 N.E.2d 908, 230 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1962). In Kraus,
the court held that an intentional injury exclusion clause will operate to relieve an
insurer of its duty to indemnify under a liability policy where the nature of the in
tentional acts of the insured is such that intent to cause harm may be inferred as a
matter of law. In Smith, the Illinois Appellate Court allowed coverage to Glena M.
Smith when she was wounded by a gun shot by Dorothy Moran. Since Moran had
intended to shoot another waitress in the restaurant, Smith's injury was the
unintentional result of an intended act. Similarly, the Putnam court held that a boy
who shot at a dog to stop the onrush of the animal, did not intend to destroy it. Con
sequently, insurance coverage was allowed under a comprehensive personal liability
policy. The Baldinger court, in a tort action, held that insurance coverage existed
when Allan Banks pushed Barbara Jane Baldinger and caused her injury. The court
held that the injury was the unintended result of an intended act. Since the exclu
sion clause was unclear and ambiguous and because the clause did not express an
intention to exclude from liability unintentional injuries resulting from deliberate
acts, coverage was provided.
73. Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967); Wigginton v. Lum
bermens Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So.2d 170 (La. Ct. App. 1964). See notes 77-82 infra and
accompanying text.
74. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Shields, 31 Mich. App. 649, 187 N.W.2d 894
(1971); Lyons v. Hartford Ins. Group, 125 N.J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (App. Div.
1973), cer!. denied, 64 N.J. 322, 315 A.2d 411 (1974); Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Blackburn, 477 P.2d 62 (Okla. 1970). See notes 87-95 infra and accompanying text.
75. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Continental
W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1976); Oakes v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 137 N.J. Super. 365, 349 A.2d 102 (App. Div. 1975). See notes 83-86 infra and
accompanying text.
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Some courts have held that if a volitional act produced an in
jury, the exclusionary language for intentionally caused injuries
applies. 76 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 77 adopts the position
that if the insured acted, the resulting injury is intentional. This
view holds that one intends the natural and probable consequences
of his acts. Using such a standard, insurance coverage could be
denied when an insured's intentional act resulted in an unintended
injury. 78
This view has been roundly rejected by the courts in liability
insurance policy cases. 79 These courts recognize that although most
acts are intentional in some sense, many unintended results flow
from intentional acts. 80 Another reason for rejecting the Restate
ment position lies in the way courts construe insurance policies.
When the language of an exclusionary clause is ambiguous, any
doubts as to its meaning are resolved against the insurer who
drafted the policy and who, therefore, could have prevented such
ambiguity.81 Since one purpose of liability insurance is to protect
injured third parties, as between the liability insurer of a culpable
actor and an innocent third party, it is better to place the risk of
loss on the insured when intent to injure is unclear. 82 In Ambassa
dor, the language of Satkin's policy did not expressly exclude cov
erage for unintended injuries which resulted from a deliberate act.
76. Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967); Wigginton v. Lum
bermens Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So. 2d 170 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) provides:
§ 8A. Intent
The word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to de
note that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he be
lieves that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.
78. Judge Clifford followed this approach in his dissenting opinion. 76 N.J. at
494,388 A.2d at 612 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 488, 388 A.2d at 609 (Pashman, J., concurring). See Grange Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Cloud v. Shelby Mut.
Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Continental W. Ins. Co. v.
Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn. 1976); Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blackburn,
477 P.2d 62, 65 (Okla. 1970); City of Bums v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Or.
364, 371, 434 P.2d 465, 469 (1967).
80. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 688 (8th Cir.
1978). An insured farmer fired his gun in the air to scare some boys who were steal
ing watermelons and killed one of the boys. Garnishment was allowed against his in
surance company.
81. Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 98, 213 N.W.2d 327, 330 (1973). In an
action by a hatcheck girl who had been pushed by a patron against a metal message
rack attached to the wall, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, where no bodily
injury was intended, such assault did not come within the exclusionary clause for in
tentionally caused injuries. See note 94 infra.
82. 76 N.J. at 489,388 A.2d at 609 (Pashman, J., concurring).
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The limits of the insurance policy, therefore, should be resolved
against the insurer so that insurance coverage will be provided.
This would not be possible, however, if the Restatement position
were adopted in construing Satkin's insurance policy.
An intermediate standard for intent requires the volitional per
formance of an act with an intent to cause injury.83 Under this
view, intent is established either by showing an actual intent to in
jure, or by showing the nature and character of the act to be such
that intent to cause harm to the other party may be inferred as a
matter of law. 84 Applying this standard in the instant case, Satkin's
arson conviction could be used to establish such intent thereby
excluding insurance coverage. Certainly, one who starts a fire in an
old, multistoried building at 3 a. m., without warning any of the in
habitants, should know that some of those persons could be seri
ously injured or killed.
This standard requires the insured to intend some injury, even
if it is not the precise injury which results, before his conduct will
be deemed intentional for purposes of denying insurance coverage.
Nevertheless, the scope of insurance coverage is still ambiguous.
The standard remains subject to the criticism that many unin
tended consequences flow from deliberate acts. 85 This would still
exclude coverage to many innocent third parties and, therefore,
fails to take into account the strong public policy of providing com
pensation to innocent victims. 86
83. Lyons v. Hartford Ins. Group, 125 N.J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (App. Div.
1973), cert. denied, 64 N.J. 322, 315 A.2d 411 (1974). See Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen,
332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). In this declaratory judgment action, the court
held that, where two neighboring farmers had had a dispute and one had hit the
other, the policy, which excluded liability for bodily injury caused intentionally, was
ambiguous. Further, the court decided the policy would be construed to exclude
coverage which was intended to cause injury. Although the defendant acted in self
defense and did not intend the injury to his neighbor, his actions fell within the ex
clusion. [d.
84. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Continental
W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. 1976); Oakes v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 137 N.J. Super. 365, 367, 349 A.2d 102, 103 (App. Div. 1975); City of Burns
v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Or. 364, 369,434 P.2d 465, 468 (1967).
85. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 688 (8th Cir.
1978).
86. See note 35, supra. In addition, it should be noted that this second standard
is usually used in assault and battery cases where the insured specifically intends an
assault but not the actual injury sustained. Thus, the question in such cases is not
whether any harm was intended, but rather the severity of the harm intended. Since
Satkin's act was not in the nature of an assault, these cases do not apply. This view is
also often espoused in dicta by courts which go on to apply the principal that for the
policy's exclusionary provisions to apply, the injury must be the intended result of
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The third standard of intent, announced in Lyons v. Hartford
Insurance Group,87 is the one used by a majority of courts 88 and
adopted by Judge Pashman in his concurring opinion. 89 Following
this view, "coverage exists under insuring and exclusion clauses
. . . for the unintended results of an intentional act, but not for
damages assessed because of an injury which was intended to be
inflicted. "90 The tortfeasor, therefore, must have an actual subjec
tive desire to inflict a specific injury before insurance coverage is
denied his victim. 91 "The rationale underlying the general rule is
that the insurance contract excludes only intended injuries and
there is no need or public policy justification for expanding this ex
clusion through presumptions of intent. "92 Certainly, sound public
policy is furthered by compensating innocent victims. 93 Further
more, if any term in an insurance contract is ambiguous, it should
be construed against the insurance company which drafted the pol
icy.94 When these cases occur, courts will interpret the insurance
an intentional act. See, e.g., City of Bums v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Or.
364, 434 P.2d 465 (1967); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. CantreIl, 18 Ariz. App. 486, 543 P.2d
962 (1973).
87. 125 N.J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (App. Div. 1973), cert. denied, 64 N.J.
322,315 A.2d 411 (1974). Lyons, who had been a police officer for 20 years, shot and
killed a man after a long drinking bout. Dazed from the alcohol and a recent beating,
he drew his gun to fire a warning shot, without an intent to kill or inflict bodily
harm. Although he would have had no right to coverage had he meant to maim or
kill, Lyons only intended to fire a warning shot and accidentally fired prematurely.
Therefore, insurance coverage was allowed.
88. E.g., Smith v. Moran, 61 Ill. App. 2d 157, 209 N.E.2d 18 (1965). Putman v.
ZelufI, 372 Mich. 553, 127 N.W.2d 374 (1964); Morrill v. Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578,
122 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Baldinger v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 15 App. Div. 2d
526, 222 N.Y.S.2d 736, afJ'd, 11 N.Y.2d 1026, 183 N.E.2d 908, 230 N.Y.S.2d 25
(1962).
89. 76 N.J. at 608,388 A.2d at 609.
90. 125 N.J. Super. at 245, 310 A.2d at 488. "It is not sufficient that the in
sured's intentional, albeit wrongful, act has resulted in unintended harm; it is the
harm itself that must be intended before the exclusion will apply." City of Bums v.
Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Or. 364, 369, 434 P.2d 465, 468 (1967).
91. Id.
92. Continental W, Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. 1976).
93. See note 35 supra.
94. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Deodato v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 143 N.]. Super. 396, 363 A.2d 361 (1976); Hanover Ins. Group v.
Cameron, 122 N.J. Super. 51, 298 A.2d 715, (Ch. 1973); Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 53 N.J. 313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 41 Ohio App.
2d 113, 322 N.E.2d 693 (1974). Adherence to this method of policy construction is
the result of the typical disparity between the bargaining positions of the insurer and
the insured. The insurer's opportunity to draft the proposed terms of the agreement
is also an opportunity for overreaching. Insurance contracts continue to be contracts
of adhesion under which the insured is left little choice beyond electing among
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contract to provide protection to the victims. 95
Despite Satkin's conviction for felony-murder, the third stan
dard would provide insurance protection to the Perez family. For
the felony-murder rule to apply, it is not necessary to prove that
the death or even the act resulting in death was intended. 96 The
death may have been quite unexpected. 97 Consequently, although
Satkin's arson may have been in wanton and wilful disregard of the
safety of his tenants, it does not follow that he subjectively in
tended to kill or injure anyone. As the court stated:
The whole purpose behind Satkin's act of arson was to defraud
the insurance company and to obtain payment for the value of
his property. He never desired that his tenants suffer injury or
death. While he certainly displayed a callous disregard for their
safety, he did not want to see them harmed by his act. Thus,
Satkin did not "expect or intend" the deaths of his tenants in the
subjective sense that is required for his act to be excluded from
the definition of "occurrence. "98

The New Jersey Court concluded that Satkin's insurance pol
icy obligated Ambassador to pay on Satkin's behalf those sums
which Satkin was legally indebted to pay for the death of Marilyn
Ortega Perez. 99 Because this indicates the strong public policy fa
voring compensating victims, the result is a desirable one. Con
spicuously absent from the court's discussion, however, was any
mention of whether the policy provides coverage given the defini
tion of "occurrence."lOO The court avoids any analysis of policy lan
guage which was intended by the insurance company to exclude instandardized provisions offered to him, even when the standard forms are prescribed
by public officials rather than insurers. In most instances, regulation is relatively
weak and even the provisions prescribed or approved by legislative or administrative
action are in essence adoptions of proposals made by insurers' draftsmen. Keeton, In
surance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961
(1970). See Appleman, "Jabberwocky" Revisited-Or, What Does My Policy Cover?
1977 INS. L. J. 279; See also Hollman, Insurance as a Contract of Adhesion, 1978
INS. L. J. 274. The insured usually has no participation in the arrangement or selec
tion of words used, yet, the language of the insurance contract is selected with con
siderable care and deliberation by legal advisors and experts employed by and acting
exclusively in the interest of the insurance company. Therefore, it is the insurance
company who is at fault for any uncertainty. Id. at 276.
95. See Appleman, supra note 94, at 281.
96. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 42 (2d ed. 1969).

97.

Id.

98.

76

N.J. at 491-92, 388 A.2d at 611. (Pashman, J., concurring).

99. Id. at 486,388 A.2d at 608 (Schreiber, J.).
100. Id. (Pashman, J., concurring).
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surance coverage for Injuries which are "either expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured. "101
Because the court chose to disregard Ambassador's definition
of "occurrence," the court also avoided any clarification of the
standard of intent to be used in interpreting insurance contracts.
Although three distinct approaches have been used,102 most courts
require proof of an actual, subjective desire to bring about the spe
cific injury which is suffered before the injured party will be
denied insurance protection. l03 This position has the advantage of
providing maximum insurance protection to innocent victims with
out altering any provisions in the insurance contract. This standard
101. Judge Clifford in his dissent argues that even if the policy in question can
be read to provide coverage in its insuring agreement, there is an implied exclusion
for the situation in which the insured bums a residential dwelling. He further con
tends that this implied exclusion is based, not on public policy, but on the expectan
cies of the parties to the insurance contract. Id. at 495, 388 A.2d at 612-13. He quotes
from Professor Robert E. Keeton's Insurance Law:
First, insurance contracts do not ordinarily cover economic detriment
occurring so regularly that it is regarded as a cost rather than a risk of that
activity or enterprise. Second, insurance contracts do not cover economic
detriment that is not fortuitous from the point of view of the person (usual
ly the insured) whose detriment is asserted as the basis of the insurer's lia
bility.
R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 5.3(a), at 278 (1971) (footnote omitted). Professor
Keeton, however, specifically mentions a solution, similar to that adopted by the ma
jority opinion, to provide coverage to an innocent victim:
Certainly fidelity to the principle that loss must be fortuitous may be pre
served without precluding liability of the insurer to the victim. The victim,
as to whom loss is fortuitous, can be allowed protection without giving cov
erage to a tortfeasor who intentionally injured him. For example, the insurer
may be required to pay the victim but granted a right of reimbursement
from the tortfeasor.
R KEETON, !NSURA_NCE LAW § 5.4(b), at 291 (1971) (citations omitted).
Although this remedy does adhere to the principle that loss must be fortuitous
from the standpoint of the insured, other considerations must be examined. Current
legislative trends seek to spread loss rather than fix responsibility. Veitch, Criminal
ity Insured: Law and Judicial Policy in Canada, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 73 (1977). It
may also be true that the threat of criminal prosecution is a much better deterrent to
criminal conduct than is the denial of insurance coverage under a liability policy. Id.
Nevertheless, giving an insurer a cause of action against an insured may be an inade
quate remedy. For example, if the insured has gone bankrupt, this cause of action is
worthless. The time and expense required for litigation may also preclude an insurer
from bringing an action against the insured when small amounts are involved. It
should be recognized that denying insurance proceeds to a wrongdoer is not a sanc
tion against criminal conduct but a matter of contract. By reforming the insurance
contract to provide coverage for criminal acts, other insureds will be forced to bear
the cost of such illegal conduct by paying increased insurance rates.
102. See notes 72-95 supra and accompanying text.

103.

[d.
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is further rationalized as a means to extend the insurance contract
to its limits. There is no need or public policy justification for ex
panding the scope of exclusions through presumptions of intent. 104
Such a standard has the added advantage of putting insurers on no
tice of the degree of specificity courts require to prove intent when
construing insurance policies. Without such a clarification, insur
ance companies are given little guidance in drafting their policies
and, consequently, face more litigation to clarify these contract
terms in the future.
Had the New Jersey Supreme Court not wished to enter the
intent imbroglio, however, the majority opinion still could have
provided a more satisfactory analysis to reach its result. First, the
remedy the court granted to Ambassador should properly be
termed a right to indemnification from its insured rather than a
right of subrogation. Viewing Ambassador as a subrogation case
yields the anomalous result that the insurance company was subro
gated to a cause of action against its own insured. Subrogation does
not embrace this situation. By analyzing the case in terms of subro
gation, the New Jersey court created an unnecessary source of con
fusion for courts seeking to follow Ambassador.
Second, the comprehensive liability policy issued to Joseph
Satkin was not an indemnity contract, but a contract to pay third
parties in the event Satkin was responsible for the injuries sus
tained by such third parties. Ambassador's obligations under the
contract were not conditioned on Satkin first being held legally lia
ble for damages. Under this view of the contract, the court could
have required Ambassador to pay the Perez family the proceeds
from Satkin's policy. It then could have implied a right of indemni
fication. l05 The right of indemnity depends on the principle that
everyone is responsible for the consequences of his own wrong,
and if others are compelled to pay damages that ought to have
been paid by the wrongdoer, they may recover from him.l06 This
implied cause of action would, therefore, effectuate the policy of
deterring intentional wrongdoing by making the wrongdoer suffer
the financial consequences of his wilful act.
R. Stephen Lee
104. Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. 1976).
105. Westville Land Co. v. Handle, 112 N.J.L. 447,171 A. 520 (N.J. 1934).
106. Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Center, 38 N.J. 549, 186 A.2d 274 (1962).

